Malicious Links

[mbays]

* Wednesday, 2021-07-14 at 20:17 +0000 - nervuri <nervuri at disroot.org>:

>"Before following a URI which is in scope of a client certificate from 
>a page (or via a redirect) outside of that scope, clients MUST display 
>the target URI and what client certificate will be used to connect to 
>it."

Better. But I think "display" is still assuming too much about the 
client. What about audio-only clients? We could make it "present", but 
still we may find that it's too restrictive... what if a client wants to 
present only a shortened form of the URI, say without the scheme? Do we 
really want to say that it's in contravention of the spec? And so on.

Really, I don't think this kind of prescriptive text for the details of 
how clients should operate belongs in the spec at all.

Perhaps it would make more sense to add some general discussion about 
this issue, either to the spec or to best-practices.gmi, saying that 
clients should ensure that a client certificate is used only when it's 
clear that the user intends it to be, and pointing out these cases where 
it might not be clear (links and redirects into the scope of 
a certificate). Then let client authors decide how to implement this in 
whatever way makes most sense for their particular clients.
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